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a b s t r a c t 
The dynamic response of benzene alkylation process to a set of deviations is analyzed with Aspen Plus 
Dynamics. A quantitative risk assessment is developed through simulations of deviation scenarios. The
process comprises a reactor and three distillation columns with a recycle stream. The simulation scenar- 
ios are determined according to lessons learnt from accidents. This study underlines the conditions that
induce an overpressure or a flooding in a distillation column. Three scenarios are proposed: feed flowrate
variations, coolant flowrate reduction and cooling of the reboiler steam. Thereafter, the results allow cal- 
culating a set of risk indexes related to flooding and overpressure phenomena. This study underlines the 
deviation propagation effects that can be expected in all the process equipment. Moreover, it represents a 
significant contribution to the definition of the process control strategy and the necessary safety 
barriers. 
1. Introduction
The analysis of consequences that can be caused by a process 
deviation is usually performed with a risk assessment methodol- 
ogy. Recently, quantitative or semi-quantitative approaches have 
emerged due to increasing requirements of process and technol- 
ogy developments ( Tian et al., 2015 ). Nowadays, it is admitted that 
risk assessment should be envisaged as a complementary approach 
in which the technical expertise is supported by simulation tools 
( Berdouzi et al., 2016 ). In this order, dynamic simulations improve 
the knowledge and understanding of the dynamic characteristics of 
a chemical process by relating its dynamic output response to an 
input disturbance ( Ingham et al., 2007 ). In this manner, it allows 
estimating various control strategies as well as the optimization of 
the control settings of the process. 
The objective of dynamic simulations is to predict how fast 
variables change in the event of an operating emergency or equip- 
ment failure ( Luyben, 2012a ). This analysis determines the time 
period to reach critical limits (safety response time) and per- 
mits the engineer to quantitatively design effective safety systems 
( Luyben, 2012b ). Therefore, dynamic simulations can contribute 
to the characterization of process deviations in future risk anal- 
yses ( Tian et al., 2015 ). In the literature, numerous papers deal 
with dynamic simulation-based HAZOP analyses ( Isimite and Ru- 
bini, 2016; Tian et al., 2015 ). In this manner, risks are quanti- 
fied thanks to the knowledge of the process abnormal behavior 
( Gabbar et al., 2003 ). This description of the dynamic evolution 
of the operating parameters allows recommending the appropri- 
ate safety barriers ( Luyben, 2012a ) and evaluating new safeguard 
methods ( Bodizs et al., 2015 ). 
Our study envisages the dynamic simulation of an industrial 
plant with ASPEN PLUS DYNAMICS 9.0 in order to analyze the 
propagation of a set of specific deviations. A preliminary study was 
carried out to show the feasibility of the method ( Murillo et al., 
2017 ). Firstly, a case study is modeled under steady-state condi- 
tions and a list of possible disturbances is defined according to 
lessons learnt from previous accidents occurred in the distillation 
columns ( ARIA, 2016; Kister, 1997, 2003 ). Next, the dynamic sim- 
ulation underlines how each deviation might lead to hazardous 
events and their associated risks. Moreover, the method allows to 
know the behavior of the process during the degraded modes and 
to quantify the severity of accidental scenarios. Thus, the final goal 
is to recommend the required safety barriers (nature, sizing and 
response time). 
2. Case study
The chemical process that is considered for this case study en- 
visages the industrial alkylation of benzene by propene to iso- 
propylbenzene, which is also denominated as cumene (C 9 H 12 ). This 
chemical process can be developed continuously with a vapor- 
phase or liquid-phase reaction. Before 1990, the former manufac- 
Fig. 1. Process flowsheet of the industrial alkylation of benzene with propene to cumene.
turing route prevailed over the liquid-phase alternative. Neverthe- 
less, the development of the alkylation reaction with zeolites as 
catalysts has allowed considering the latter as a more appropri- 
ate technique ( Bellussi et al., 1995; Corma et al., 20 0 0 ). Besides 
the production of cumene, the alkylation process also implies the 
production of polyalkylates and polyisopropylbenzenes as well as 
propylene oligomers due to a set of consecutive reactions. For this 
reason, the alkylation reactions are carried out with large pore ze- 
olites (e.g. MCM-22) and a molar feed ratio of benzene/propylene 
over 4:1. These operating conditions provide a major significance of 
the production of the cumene and the diisopropylbenzene (C 12 H 15 ) 
with regard to other by-products. Further information about the 
physicochemical properties of the zeolites and their influence on 
the selectivity of the reaction can be consulted in the experimen- 
tal study developed by ( Corma et al., 1995 ). 
2.1. General description of the process 
The work presented in this paper considers the manufacturing 
process of cumene from benzene and propene in the liquid phase 
with zeolites as catalysts. Previous studies have characterized the 
cumene production in the vapor phase as well as its control struc- 
ture ( Gera et al., 2013; Luyben, 2010 ). In this study, the produc- 
tion is in the liquid phase and the process shown in Fig. 1 , which 
is composed of a Packed Bed Reactor (PBR) and a train of distilla- 
tion columns (C-1 to C-3). The separation equipment recovers ben- 
zene, which is the excess reagent, to be recycled to the reactor. 
Additionally, the columns recover and purify cumene along with a 
by-product of the process (diisopropylbenzene). These characteris- 
tics constitute an important simulation complexity since the recy- 
cle promotes the propagation of operating parameter deviations. 
The case study is an industrial plant that produces 87.6 ktons 
per year with a global manufacture efficiency of 95% ( Fig. 1 ). The 
dynamic simulation is developed according to the operating con- 
ditions specified by Dimian and Bildea (2008) for the PBR and the 
distillation columns. Initially, a makeup stream of 91.3 kmol ·hr −1 
Table 1
Global apparent kinetic parameters of the benzene alkylation to cumene and
diisopropylbenzene ( Dimian and Bildea, 2008 ).
Chemical reaction Chemical reaction rates
Benzene alkylation C 6 H 6 + C 3 H 6 → C 9 H 12 r 1 = 6510 exp( − 52564 RT ) C C 3 H6
Cumene alkylation C 9 H 12 + C 3 H 6 → C 12 H 15 r 2 = 450 exp( − 50 0 0 0 RT ) C C 3 H6
of benzene is fed along with a makeup stream of 100.9 kmol hr −1 
of aliphatic hydrocarbons: propane and propene. This stream is 
mainly composed of the alkene whose molar fraction is 99%. Ad- 
ditionally, both streams are mixed with the recycle of the second 
distillation column in order to have a benzene/propylene ratio of 
7:1 in the reactor feed (RF). This ratio ensures the desired selectiv- 
ity to cumene at the reactor outlet (RO). 
The process consists of a reaction unit and a separation unit 
that recovers the unreacted compounds and purifies the alkylated 
hydrocarbons. The first unit carries out the alkylation reactions in 
the PBR. This is a tubular adiabatic equipment whose diameter and 
length are 1.3 and 10 m respectively. This reactor is filled with the 
bed of the solid catalyst (d p equal to 2.4 mm) to constitute a void 
fraction equal to 0.4. This reactor configuration defined the sim- 
ulation scheme proposed by Dimian and Bildea (2008) as well as 
the kinetic parameters of the cumene and diisopropylbenzene pro- 
duction according to the operating conditions of the process equip- 
ment. This scheme poses a pseudo-first-order reaction adjusted to 
the temperature range of the industrial reaction unit (150-230 °C) 
and a high benzene/propylene feed ratio (5-8:1). Thus, the Arrhe- 
nius expressions that are listed in Table 1 are obtained by calcu- 
lating two apparent kinetic constants that take into account not 
only the chemical reaction but also the mass transfer phenomena 
occurring in the liquid phase. The activation energies of the Arrhe- 
nius equations are expressed in kJ ·kmol -1 and the reaction rates in 
kmol ·m −3 ·s −1 . 
Table 2
Design specifications of the distillation columns of the separation unit.
Design specification C-1 C-2 C-3
Separation specification Aliphatics in distillate: Benzene in distillate: Cumene in distillate:
Recovery: 99.0% Recovery: 99.9% Recovery: 99.5%
Purity: 99.9% Purity: 99.0% Purity: 99.0%
Condenser Total (Logarithmic mean temperature
difference)
Total (Logarithmic mean temperature
difference)
Total (Logarithmic mean temperature
difference)







Height (m) 3.9 6.0 5.0
Number of stages 13 19 18
Feed stage 6 10 9
Reflux ratio 44.52 0.157 0.325
The performance of the reaction unit is established by the con- 
version of propene, which is 93.1% at steady-state conditions. Sim- 
ilarly, the selectivity of the alkylation reactions is established as 
the ratio of the moles of the mono and disubstituted hydrocar- 
bons that are produced in the packed bed reactor. The high ben- 
zene/propene ratio determines a steady-state operation with the 
production of 25.8 moles of cumene per mole of diisopropylben- 
zene. Subsequently, the products of the reactor are separated in the 
second unit, which consists of a series of three distillation columns 
packed with pall rings. First, they are fed to a distillation tower 
(C-1) that separates the aliphatic compounds (propane and unre- 
acted propene in D1) from the aromatic hydrocarbons, which are 
concentrated at the bottom of the column (B1). This separation de- 
mands a high reflux ratio ( Table 2 ) because the fraction of aliphatic 
compounds is negligible with regard to that of aromatic hydrocar- 
bons. Then, the aromatic compounds are fed to a second tower (C- 
2) that separates the unreacted benzene (D2) from the alkylated
hydrocarbons (B2). Thereafter, the recovered benzene is recycled to
the reactor. Finally, the distillate of the third column (C-3) is com- 
posed of high purity cumene (D3) whereas the bottoms are con- 
stituted by the remaining diisopropylbenzene (B3). Moreover, the
industrial process can add another column to purify this hydrocar- 
bon from other high molecular weight by-products. The separation 
sequence of the distillation towers is defined to ensure a good re- 
covery of the light compound fed to each tower. The design and 
separation specifications of the columns are shown in Table 2 . 
Additionally, Fig. 1 also presents the heat exchangers that are 
included in the flow diagram of the chemical process (E-1 to E- 
4). The exchangers E-1 and E-2 are positioned in a network that 
preheats the reactive mixture with the outlet stream of the reac- 
tor and medium pressure steam (MPS) respectively. On the con- 
trary, the other two exchangers reduce the temperature of the feed 
streams of the columns C-2 and C-3 with a coolant fluid as a 
utility. Finally, two pumps (P-1 and P-2) are implemented in the 
chemical process to pressurize the makeup streams and the recy- 
cle of the column C-2 until 36 bar. This pressurization level is set 
in order to avoid a phase change of the reactive mixture within the 
reactor. Similarly, the valves (V-1 to V-3) are included to adjust the 
feed pressure of the distillation columns. These elements allowed 
equalizing the pressure of each feed stream to the corresponding 
pressure of the feed stage. 
The conditions are determined by a steady-state simulation of 
the chemical process that is developed with the software ASPEN 
PLUS 9.0 TM under a sequential modular approach. This scheme im- 
plies the definition of unit block operations that are solved one 
at a time in sequence by the simulator by considering the inlet 
stream variables and a set of specified parameters ( Smith, 2016 ). 
For this study, the thermodynamic model is based on the Peng–
Robinson equation since the system is only composed of hydrocar- 
bons whose critical pressures range between 24.5 bar (diisopropy- 
lbenzene) and 48.9 bar (benzene). These values are considerably 
higher than the operating conditions of the process equipment 
with vapor-liquid equilibria. 
2.2. Control structure of the process 
The plantwide control structure of the chemical process is also 
presented in Fig. 2: 
It is divided into three nodes: reactor, intermediate heat ex- 
changers, and columns. In the first group, the total feed flowrate of 
the reactor is regulated by manipulating the flowrate of the ben- 
zene makeup stream (FC), which is the chemical compound with 
the highest flowrate in the recycle stream. In the same manner, the 
temperature of the feed stream of the reactor is controlled with 
the utility temperature of the heat exchanger E-2 (TC). The second 
group consists of the temperature controllers of the other inter- 
mediate heat exchangers (E-3 and E4). The objective is to reduce 
the feed stream temperature of the distillation columns C-2 and C- 
3. This regulation is achieved by manipulating the coolant flow of
each heat exchanger (TC). The control parameters of these nodes
are listed in Table 3 .
Additionally, the third group of control loops regulates the per- 
formance of the distillation columns. Five control loops are usually 
considered for this type of equipment ( Luyben, 2006; Wang et al., 
2016 ). Firstly, the condenser pressure is regulated by manipulating 
the coolant flowrate (PC). The liquid levels of the reflux drums are 
controlled by adjusting the distillate flowrates (LC). In the same 
manner, the liquid levels of the sumps are controlled with the ma- 
nipulation of the bottoms flowrates (LC). Besides, there is a tem- 
perature control in a specific stage of each column (TC). It adjusts 
the temperature of the heating steam in the boiler in order to sta- 
bilize the stage with the highest variation in the temperature pro- 
file of the vessel. This strategy is proposed by Luyben (2006) for 
the temperature control of a distillation column. The last control 
loop corresponds to a ratio control (X) between the feed flowrate 
and the reflux rate for each column of the separation unit. The 
control parameters of the distillation columns are listed in Table 4 . 
The dynamic simulation is developed by exporting the steady- 
state simulation to ASPEN PLUS DYNAMICS 9.0 TM as a flow-driven 
mode. This definition is determined by considering that the out- 
let temperatures of the process streams in the intermediate heat 
exchangers are below the corresponding boiling points. To make 
a dynamic simulation, it is necessary to define the models that 
represent the process equipment. For instance, a logarithmic mean 
temperature difference is used for the condensers and the inter- 
mediate heat exchangers (E-1 to E-5 in Fig. 1 ). The modelling of 
the reboilers of the columns is commonly based on the constant 
temperature model. Then, the control loops described above are 
implemented in the dynamic simulation in order to analyze the 
response of the control structure after the occurrence of a given 
Fig. 2. Aspen plus dynamics flowsheet of the cumene process.
Table 3
Control parameters of the packed bed reactor and the intermediate heat exchangers.
Position (control loop) Action Type Controlled variable Manipulated variable
Reactor Feed Flow (BENZENE_FC) Reverse PI Feed flowrate Benzene flowrate
Heat exchanger E-2 (E-2_TC) Reverse PID with dead time Feed temperature Temperature of heating steam
Heat exchanger E-3 (E-3_TC) Direct PI with dead time Outlet temperature Cooling fluid flowrate
Heat exchanger E-4 (E-4_TC) Direct PID with dead time Outlet temperature Cooling fluid flowrate
Table 4
Control parameters of the distillation columns.
Position CONTROL LOOP ACTION TYPE Controlled variable Manipulated variable
REFLUX DRUM C-1_CondPC Direct PI Pressure Cooling fluid flowrate
C-2_CondPC
C-3_CondPC
REFLUX DRUM C-1_DrumLC Direct P Level Distillate rate
C-2_DrumLC
C-3_DrumLC
SUMP C-1_SumpLC Direct P Level Bottoms rate
C-2_SumpLC
C-3_SumpLC
REFLUX FtoR_C-1 Direct (Multiplier) X Reflux to feed ratio Reflux rate
FtoR_C-2
FtoR_C-3
COLUMN Reverse PID with dead time Temperature Temperature of heating steam
C-1 - Stage 03 C-1_TC
C-2 - Stage 15 C-2_TC
C-3 - Stage 16 C-3_TC
disturbance or deviation. All the parameters of the controllers are 
tuned according to a conventional method such as Ziegler-Nichols. 
Some details about the simulation settings have been added but 
for more information, the reference of our works in this field 
( Berdouzi, 2017 ) is cited in the text. 
2.3. Process safety valves 
Figs. 1 and 2 show the process safety valves PSV-1, PSV-2, and 
PSV-3, which are positioned at the top of each distillation column 
as a safety barrier, upstream to the condenser. As PSV devices are 
essential for the process safety. In order to simulate the real func- 
tioning of the process safety valves, it is possible to represent their 
opening and closing by a schematic lift-pressure diagram that is 
commonly called as PSV hysteresis. The characteristic PSV parame- 
Table 5
Hysteresis and design parameters of the process safety valves.
Design specifications PSV-1 PSV-2 PSV-3
Set pressure – SP (bar) 14.40 3.60 2.00
Primary lift valve position - PLVP (%) 10 10 10
Full lift pressure, opening -FLO (bar) 15.12 3.78 2.10
Full lift pressure, closing -FLC (bar) 14.40 3.60 1.30
Reseating pressure – RP (bar) 13.68 3.42 1.10
Reseat valve position - RVP (%) 50 50 50
ters are mentioned in Fig. 3 and Table 5 . These settings allow a PSV 
response that constitutes an immediate response to an overpres- 
sure without generating oscillations due to the action of pressure 
controllers. 
Fig. 3. Hysteresis diagram of a process safety valve.
Fig. 3 illustrates the functioning of a PSV. At the pressure set 
SP, the process safety valve gradually opens until the Primary Lift 
Valve Position PLVP (10%). At the Full Lift Opening Pressure FLO, 
the process safety valve totally opens. It remains open until the 
Full Lift Closing Pressure FLC. Then, the process safety valve grad- 
ually closes until the Reseat Valve Position RVP (50%). When the 
pressure is equal to the Reseating Pressure RP, the process safety 
valves are totally closed. For the cumene process, the different 
thresholds are chosen in accordance with the recommendations of 
the DIERS method (Design Institute for Emergency Relief System) 
constituted by the AIChE engineers (American Institute of Chemical 
Engineers). The sizing of the pressure safety valves is performed by 
estimating the overhead vapor rate of a vent release. The different 
diameters of the process safety valves are determined according to 
the DIERS method ( Etchells and Wilday, 1998; Gustin, 2006, 2009 ). 
The sizing criterion of this method can be associated with failures 
of the control valves, reflux, power or coolant supply or even an 
exterior fire. The scenario considered for this purpose corresponds 
to a total loss of heat removal in the condensers since it represents 
the major increases in the top pressure. It is in accordance with the 
vent sizing strategy recommended by Kister (1990) . The bore diam- 
eter is determined according to a standard code ( API 520-I, 2008 ). 
Table 5 gives the specifications of the PSV. 
3. Simulation scenarios
The simulation scenarios of this study are defined in this sec- 
tion according to a review of accidental reports. This analysis eval- 
uates the factors that can generate an abnormal operation in a 
distillation column. Then, the simulation of these scenarios allows 
evaluating their potential effects on the chemical process. 
3.1. Literature review 
According to Kister (2003) , the number of malfunctions in dis- 
tillation columns is increasing in spite of the advances in the distil- 
lation technology. The lessons learnt from accidents are not always 
effectively communicated and the undesired malfunctions are in- 
cessantly repeated. Kister (1997) has listed the main failures and 
deviations that cause abnormal operations in the distillation tow- 
ers. The failure concerns the malfunction of a device whereas a 
deviation considers any change from the normal operating condi- 
tions. 
The obtained data associate the operating problems mainly 
with troublesome column internals and operational difficulties. 
These causes are followed by instrumentation and control failures 
and facility mishaps. These four factors represent 60% of the re- 
ported cases and are the most common malfunctions considered 
by the troubleshooters. Most of the remaining cases correspond to 
design mistakes, startup/shutdown difficulties, and heat exchangers 
failures. The knowledge of these factors is determining since they 
can represent 27% of the reported malfunctions. Finally, the re- 
maining cases are linked to the tray and downcomer layout, foam- 
ing and relief problems. 
The dynamic response of the plant-wide structure can be char- 
acterized by a set of scenarios that describes the behavior of the 
manufacturing process. This analysis constitutes a great advantage 
in the development of a risk assessment since it allows evaluating 
the behavior of different process variables at the same time. How- 
ever, it is necessary to define a clear scope in the analysis of the 
simulation results since many elements can be omitted due to a 
general study of the chemical process. For this reason, this discus- 
sion envisages the dynamic response of the cumene process equip- 
ment but focuses on the negative effects occurred in the separation 
unit. This case study mainly considers scenarios associated with 
column flooding and overpressure. These phenomena are analyzed 
because they may result in a hydrocarbons leak in the columns. 
The abnormal operation of a distillation column under these cir- 
cumstances is described as follows: 
• Flooding: This inoperability condition is caused by an exces- 
sive retention of liquid inside the column. This issue is due to a
high vapor/liquid loading ( Gorak and Schoenmakers, 2014 ). This
abnormal operation is mainly associated with changes in the
tanks levels, increases in the pressure drop and deterioration
of the mass transfer efficiency ( Gorak and Schoenmakers, 2014;
Treybal, 1980 ).
• Overpressure: The deviations and failures that can lead to an
overpressure of a distillation column depend strictly on its
design and operating conditions. However, the most common
sources and causes can be grouped in the checklist that was
proposed by Kister (1990) . These reasons are listed in Table 6 .
3.2. Lessons learnt from previous accidents 
The accidents occurred in distillation column are related to dif- 
ferent causes according to the accidents reports. The lessons learnt 
from accidents study is a common practice and plays a key role 
in the improvement of safety of industrial processes ( Kletz, 2009 ). 
There are several accident databases available for this purpose. For 
example, we can quote the European MARS (Major Accident Re- 
porting System), the American CSB (Chemical Safety Board) and 
the French ARIA (Analysis, Research and Information on the Acci- 
dents). The latter database is chosen for this study since it is well- 
documented on the accident causes and also takes into account the 
foreign accidents. 
A review of the lessons learnt in the ARIA database is per- 
formed in this study. This analysis only considers the events that 
led to major losses between 1990 and April 2017 (explosion, fire, 
leaks, and vent to reliefs or flares). The causes and the conse- 
quences of the 81 accidents found in the ARIA database are ana- 
lyzed in Fig. 4 . The human errors (22.9%) and the material (20.8%) 
represent the main causes. Similarly, the survey established that 
fire (58.3%) and vent release (20.8%) are the most frequent conse- 
quences whereas a minor fraction results in a vapor cloud explo- 
sion (5.2%). 
The surveys and lessons learnt have shown that sometimes the 
column flooding or overpressure lead to an accident due to vent 
releases or leaks. An example of this situation is illustrated in the 
investigation report of the BP Texas refinery accident that occurred 
in 2005 (US Chemical Safety Board, 2007 ). The bottoms of a raf- 
finate splitter tower heated up its feed stream in an exchanger 
Table 6
Factors responsible for the distillation column overpressure ( Kister, 1990 ).
Failures and deviations Causes
Utility failure • Loss of coolant (heat removal)
• Loss of electric power
• Loss of steam
• Loss of instrument air
Controller failure or Human error under manual operation • Failure of the steam controller
• Failure of the pressure controller
• Failure of the feed controller
• Failure of the reflux (or pumparound) controller (or
pump)
Extraneous sources • Valve opening to an external pressure source
• Loss of heating in an upstream column
• Failure of exchanger
• Exterior fire
Internal sources • Accumulation of noncondensables
• Chemical reaction
• Closes column outlets
Transient sources • Pockets of water in a hot tower
• Steam hammer
• Internal explosions
Fig. 4. Causes and consequences of malfunctions in distillation columns from ARIA database (1990–2017).
network. The failure of one of the level controls of this column 
caused its excessive level increase. This abnormal operation also 
augmented the temperature of the liquid stored in the column. 
Then, the interaction of the energy network caused that the hot 
bottoms also heated up the feed flow to hazardous levels. Both 
failures caused the flooding of the column and the subsequent 
overflowing ( Kalantarnia et al., 2010; Manca and Brambilla, 2012 ). 
This deviation initiated a sequence of events that led to the re- 
lease of an explosive vapor cloud, which later ignited and caused 
15 deaths and 170 injuries. Certainly, this case illustrates the influ- 
ence of the variations of the feed conditions (operational difficulty) 
and the failures of the control systems. This case also shows that 
the disturbances in a distillation column might become more rele- 
vant when the chemical process is interactive due to the presence 
of a recycle stream ( Smith and Corripio, 1985 ). The interactions 
among the process units enhance the propagation of a disturbance; 
hence, they must be taken into account for the evaluation of con- 
sequences during a risk assessment. 
Likewise, other computational characterizations of the con- 
trol structures of distillation columns ( Bezzo et al., 2004; 
Ebrahimzadeh and Baxter, 2016; Luyben, 2012a ) have also analyzed 
the drastic coolant flowrate reduction as the main hazardous event 
due to a high pressurization of the systems in which this deviation 
has occurred. An example of this situation is registered on the ac- 
cident reports of the database of the Bureau of Analysis of Risks 
and Industrial Pollution (BARPI ARIA, abbreviated in French). The 
report N ° 45,345 of this database registers the leakage of 55 tons 
of methanol on March 16, 2013, in a biodiesel production center in 
Limay, France. The main cause is attributed to the failure of a mo- 
tor of the refrigeration system that increased the temperature and 
the pressure of a distillation column. This fact led to the subse- 
quent release through a rupture disk. This example describes how 
the refrigeration loss emerged from an electric failure that affects 
the coolant supply. 
Previous dynamic analyses have simulated cooling system fail- 
ures by setting the pressure control to a manual mode and re- 
ducing the flowrate of the corresponding coolant. In this manner, 
all the cooling factors that may cause an overpressure of the sys- 
tem can be represented. This situation has already been associated 
with accidents occurred in the industry. For instance, the report 
N ° 22,626 of the BARPI ARIA (2016) reports a loss of containment 
in a gasoline stabilization column of a refinery located in Feyzin 
(France) in 2002. The release of a pressurized hydrocarbons mix- 
ture was caused by the opening of a process safety valve. The final 
report attributed the accident to an overheating occurred during 
the startup of the column when the pressure was manually regu- 
lated by the operator. 
3.3. Definition of the simulation scenarios 
The literature and lessons learnt from accidents established 
how a change in the feed conditions and the heat removal fail- 
ure might lead to flooding or overpressure in a distillation col- 
umn. These deviations are simulated in the benzene alkylation 
process in order to estimate their propagation effects. Addition- 
ally, Kister (1990) listed the failures and deviations leading to an 
overpressure in a distillation column and their potential associated 
causes ( Table 6 ). One of these deviations is also evaluated in order 
to estimate its potential impacts on the chemical process as well. 
For this case, an extraneous source related to the heating efficiency 
is studied. In accordance with this definition, this study analyzes 
three different types of scenarios according to a deviation of the 
following process variables: 
• Flowrate of the makeup streams (feed conditions).
• Coolant flowrate of each condenser (heat removal).
• Steam temperature of the reboilers (heating in an upstream col- 
umn).
The direct influence of these variables on the performance of 
the train of distillation columns is established with the description 
of the deviation effects on the chemical process units as well as 
the potentially hazardous consequences. Subsequently, the flood- 
ing and overpressure risks associated with these deviations are es- 
timated according to the simulation results. For this purpose, each 
deviation is implemented in a simulation scenario as a step change 
in one of the process variables listed above. The deviation of each 
scenario occurs after a steady-state period of 6 h. Thereafter, the 
dynamic response of the system is analyzed for an additional pe- 
riod of 24 h. In this manner, it is possible to establish the effects 
of the deviation propagation with a description of the transient be- 
havior of some key process variables. The dynamic simulations are 
developed without considering some complementary safety barri- 
ers such as alarms, operator’s response or integrated safety sys- 
tems. Thus, the protection layers analyzed in this study only corre- 
spond to basic process control systems and pressure relief devices. 
4. Variation of the flowrate of the makeup streams (scenarios
1 to 4)
The first type of simulation scenarios deals with the flowrate 
variation of the makeup stream composed of propene and propane. 
The steady-state value of this variable is 100.9 kmol hr −1 . The de- 
viations are simulated by setting a step variation of the flowrate of 
the stream “ALIPHATI” ( Fig. 2 ). For this analysis, four scenarios are 
simulated with different values of this makeup stream flowrate: 
• Scenario 1: Aliphatic flowrate reduced by 15%
• Scenario 2: Aliphatic flowrate reduced by 5%
• Scenario 3: Aliphatic flowrate increased by 5%
• Scenario 4: Aliphatic flowrate increased by 15%
4.1. Effects of the deviation on the performance of the packed bed 
reactor 
The action of the flow controller due to the flowrate deviation 
of aliphatic hydrocarbons modifies the propene/benzene ratio. This 
fact causes an important change of the conversion and selectivity 
of the alkylation reactions. Fig. 5 shows that a surge of the propene 
flowrate increases its conversion due to a higher concentration of 
this hydrocarbon in the reactive mixture. However, it also enhances 
the production of diisopropylbenzene, which represents a decrease 
of the chemical reactions selectivity. This fact allows concluding 
that the deviations of the flowrates have opposite effects on con- 
version and selectivity ( Fig. 5 ). It can also be noted that the process 
reaches a new steady state after each disturbance. 
Furthermore, the variations of the benzene alkylation rates in 
the packed bed reactor induce the propagation of the deviation 
through the separation unit. This fact can be explained by the con- 
version results in the reactor. The cumene and diisopropylbenzene 
flowrates change according to the benzene variation. As a result, 
the feed flowrates of the three distillation columns change as well. 
These effects can be clearly observed by analyzing the flowrates 
of the following streams: Reactor outlet (RO), bottoms of C-1, C-2 
and C-3 and the distillate of C3. For this purpose, the responses of 
these variables to the greatest propene flowrate variations ( ±15%) 
are compared with the normal operation values in Fig. 6 . 
Fig. 6 shows that the makeup streams variations have an ef- 
fect on the chemical process behavior. The effects observed in the 
reaction conversion and selectivity represents a significant varia- 
tion in the flowrates of each hydrocarbon along the process. De- 
spite the fact that the deviation only modifies the propene molar 
fraction in the reactor feed between 0.10 ( −15%) and 0.14 ( + 15%), 
there is an important variation in the cumene and diisopropylben- 
zene flowrates: a decrease of 22% ( −15%) and an increase of 18% 
( + 15%). These deviations are not temporary but permanent; hence,
they induce another steady-state condition for the industrial pro- 
cess. These results show that the deviation propagation can induce 
magnified effects along the process units. Thus, it is also neces- 
sary to analyze the performance of the separation equipment. This 
analysis allows identifying the hazardous events that might emerge 
due to a significant variation of the composition of the reactor feed 
stream. 
4.2. Effects of the deviation on the performance of the distillation 
columns 
The only scenario that generates an overpressure of one of 
the distillation columns corresponds to an increase of 15% of the 
aliphatic makeup stream. The column C-3 is submitted to a pres- 
sure increase of 0.34 bar when this deviation occurs ( Fig. 7 ). The 
pressure control loop of this column determines a new steady-state 
pressure at the top of the column. This overpressure is below the 
set pressure (SP) and the primary lift (PL) pressure specified for the 
valve PSV–3 in Table 5 . Therefore, the safety valve does not open 
and the top vapors are not vented for this deviation. This result es- 
tablishes that an increase of 15% in the propene makeup flowrate 
does not constitute an accident by itself but it contributes signif- 
icantly to a pressure increase at the top of the column C-3. This 
abnormal operation might result in an accident if the effects are 
enhanced by another hazardous event (e.g. failure in a distillation 
temperature control). 
Furthermore, the flooding of a distillation column represents 
an uncontrollable accumulation of liquid in the packed bed 
that makes a continuous operation of the column more difficult 
Fig. 5. Evolution of the propene conversion and the cumene selectivity during the deviation.
Fig. 6. Influence of makeup flowrate variation on the molar flowrates.
Fig. 7. Pressure increase of the distillation column C-3 for the scenario 4.
( Kister, 1990 ). This abnormal operation demands not only the feed 
flowrate regulation but also the action of the temperature and 
pressure controllers in order to regulate the heat transfer in the 
reboilers and the condensers and adjust the liquid/vapor ratio in 
the column. The flowrate variations also affect the hydraulic per- 
formance of the distillation columns. Indeed, flooding or entrain- 
ment can emerge in the column if the liquid or gas rates are exces- 
sive. For this reason, columns that operate with non-foaming liq- 
uids are usually designed for gas velocities lower than 80% of the 
critical flooding velocity ( Treybal, 1980 ). The column stage flood- 
ing factor is defined as the ratio between the gas velocity and its 
critical value in this theoretical stage. 
Let us consider the case where the flowrate represented by 
‘propene and propane makeup´in Fig. 1 changes ±15% (scenarios 1 
& 4). These deviations propagate in several stages: 
• The packed bed reactor is the first equipment affected by the
deviation. The conversion and selectivity of the chemical reac- 
tions change in accordance with the reagent ratio. The compo- 
sition of the reactor outlet (RO in Fig. 1 ) changes.
• Then, column C-1 is fed by the outlet of the reactor. In conse- 
quence, the separation in this column is modified due to vari- 
ations in the vapor-liquid equilibria. The flowrates and compo- 
sitions of the distillate and bottoms of this column (D1 & B1)
vary with regard to the normal operating conditions.
• A similar propagation effect is observed in columns C-2 and C-
3.
• Moreover, the propagation is enhanced by the presence of a
recycle stream, which corresponds to the distillate flowrate of
column C-2 (D2). The loop generates a secondary effect on the
reactor feed (RF). This fact increases the propagation effects
listed in the previous bullets.
In order to illustrate these propagations, Fig. 8 represents the 
flooding factors in the distillation columns during the deviations 
(scenarios 1 & 4). Their dynamic responses are classified into three 
different behaviors according to the influence of the hydrocarbon 
with the highest flowrate in C-1 and C-2 (benzene): 
Firstly, the flooding factors of the column C-1 evidence a drastic 
change during a period of 1.5 h approximately. This observation is 
due to the surge of benzene when propene flowrate is decreased 
( Fig. 8 A) or due to the surge of the alkylated hydrocarbons when 
it is increased ( Fig. 8 D). This abnormal operation represents an im- 
portant deviation that is caused by the high reflux ratio (44.5) that 
is required to separate the small amounts of the aliphatic hydro- 
carbons. However, the flooding variations are temporary due to 
the regulation of the flow controller that is installed on the feed 
stream of the packed bed reactor. 
Secondly, the changes of the flooding factors of C-2 is smaller 
but sustained. Fig. 8 B and E show that the second column is 
moderately affected. Indeed, it normally separates the unreacted 
benzene (600 kmol ·hr -1 approximately). Therefore, the distillate 
flowrate only varies between -4.4% for the scenario 4 and + 4.7% 
for the scenario 1. As a result, no significant effect is observed in 
the liquid holdup. 
Finally, Fig. 8 C and F show a greater variation in the last col- 
umn due to the changes of the feed flowrates of the alkylated hy- 
drocarbons ( Fig. 6 ). This result underlines how the deviation prop- 
agates through all the process equipment and induces a flooding 
phenomenon. 
Finally, Fig. 9 shows the influence of the deviation magnitude 
on the number of flooded stages of the distillation columns. The 
extent of a deviation has a radical influence on its correction and 
the system behavior ( Labovský et al., 2007 ). For this reason, the 
initial and final numbers of flooded stages in the most affected 
columns (C-1 and C-3) are compared for the ±5% and ±15% sce- 
narios. The simulation allows establishing the critical values for 
the process deviation by analyzing the dynamic response in both 
columns. Fig. 9 A shows that the temporary abnormal operation as- 
sociated with the partial flooding of the column C-1 is enhanced 
by the increase of the benzene flowrate. The reduction of −5% to 
−15% implies the change from one to six flooded stages. Therefore,
the equipment is submitted to a longer period of instability due
to the flooding. Similarly, Fig. 9 B shows that the affectation of the
increase of the aliphatic compounds from + 5% to + 15% represents
the flooding of seven additional stages.
This section of the paper only discusses the deviation effects 
on the flooding level of the distillation columns. Nonetheless, this 
analysis can be completed by the study of the evolution of other 
process variables. For example, consider the steam consumption in 
the distillation column C-1 when the aliphatic makeup flowrate is 
decreased by 15%. For this deviation, the propene flowrate diminu- 
tion implies the increase of the benzene flowrate at the reactor 
outlet. This fact leads to a greater concentration of this compound 
at the feed of the column. The greater presence of heavy com- 
pounds in this column alters the vapor-liquid equilibria. Thus, it 
is necessary to have a higher steam consumption ( + 20%) in order 
to regulate the temperature of stage 3 of column C-1. 
5. Coolant flowrate reduction in one of the distillation
columns (scenarios 5 to 7)
The second type of simulation scenarios envisages the coolant 
flowrate reduction in the condenser of one of the distillation 
columns in accordance with the lessons learnt discussed in 
Section 3.2 . For this purpose, three additional scenarios are pro- 
posed for the analysis of the dynamic simulations. The simulation 
results describe the response of the chemical process to the reduc- 
tion of the coolant flowrate in one of the distillation columns. The 
following deviations are simulated by setting a pressure controller 
to manual mode and adjusting the value of the coolant flowrate to 
20% of the steady-state value. 
• Scenario 5: Coolant flowrate reduced by 80% in C-1
• Scenario 6: Coolant flowrate reduced by 80% in C-2
• Scenario 7: Coolant flowrate reduced by 80% in C-3
5.1. Effects of the deviation on the performance of the distillation 
columns 
The heat removal reduction represents a variation of the ther- 
mal loads in all the downstream heat transfer equipment. Initially, 
the failure of the cooling unit increases the outlet temperature 
of the remaining coolant but the action is insufficient. In conse- 
quence, the column modifies its vapor and liquid flowrate pro- 
files and deteriorates its separation efficiency. This fact enhances 
the propagation of the deviation since the feed compositions and 
Fig. 8. Variations of the flooding factors of the distillation columns caused by the changes of the makeup flowrates.
Fig. 9. Influence of the makeup flowrates variation on the column flooding (C-1 and C-3).
flowrates of the downstream equipment are determined by the 
vapor-liquid equilibria inside the column with the deviation. This 
result can be observed in Fig. 10 , which shows the variations of the 
thermal loads that are predicted by the dynamic simulations. For 
this purpose, Fig. 10 A–C show the ratio between the heat trans- 
ferred in each condenser ( Q cond ) and its initial steady-state value 
( Q ∗
cond
). Likewise, Fig. 10 D to F show the ratio between the heat 




In accordance with the heat transfer variations, the dynamic re- 
sponse observed in each scenario is described as follows: 
• Scenario 5: The coolant flowrate is reduced in C-1 from 29,132
to 5826 kg hr −1 ( −80% in Fig. 10 A). The effects are not com- 
pletely corrected by the action of the temperature controllers
of the distillation columns. The control of the column C-1 im- 
mediately reduces the steam temperature in order to regulate
the temperature profile of the column. However, the deviation
remains during the rest of the simulation time, which also im- 
plies a continuous overheating in the column. Both contrary 
effects induce the periodic oscillations that are observed in 
Fig. 10 D. This phenomenon affects the temperature and compo- 
sition of the products of the column, which causes the propaga- 
tion of the periodic behavior to the other two columns ( Fig. 10 B 
and C and E and F). However, the amplitude is inferior in these 
columns due to the action of more control loops through the 
main streams of the process. 
• Scenario 6: The coolant flowrate is reduced in C-2 from
195,664 to 39,133 kg hr −1 ( −80% in Fig. 10 B). In consequence,
the upstream and downstream columns are affected since the
heat transfer is notably reduced in C-1 and slightly increased
in C-3. This fact corroborates again the high interactivity level
of the system that is caused by the recycle stream of the sys- 
tem. The reduction of the separation level of the column affects
the makeup flowrates of benzene and aliphatic hydrocarbons.
In fact, the decrease of the heat transfer in C-2 is associated
Fig. 10. Heat transfer variations occurred after the coolant flowrate reduction in one of the distillation columns.
with a reduction of the benzene fed to the column, which also 
reduces the propene dilution in the reacting mixture. This ab- 
normal condition enhances the reaction rate (pseudo first-order 
kinetics) but diminishes the cumene selectivity. This increase of 
the diisopropylbenzene production explains the increase of the 
thermal loads in C-3. 
• Scenario 7: The coolant flowrate is reduced in C-3 from 42,165
to 8433 kg hr −1 ( −80% in Fig. 10 C). The effects of this deviation
on the thermal loads of the separation equipment are negligi- 
ble in the upstream columns in spite of this reduction. Thus,
the system only manipulates the steam temperature in C-3 to
regulate the temperature profile of this column.
The simulation results discussed above show that the deviations 
of the condensers of C-1 and C-2 involve greater risks than the C- 
3 condenser deviation due to their high propagation levels. This 
result can be explained by considering the flowrate profiles shown 
in Fig. 11 . 
The main issues emerged from the failures of the condensers 
of C-1 and C-2 are associated with the undesired feed of propene 
to the column C-2 (bottoms of C-1) and benzene to the column 
C-3 (bottoms of C-2). These abnormal conditions imply the pres- 
ence of light hydrocarbons in the low-pressure equipment. This
fact deteriorates the performance and separation efficiency of the
distillation columns in both scenarios. However, the controllabil- 
ity of the thermal loads after the deviation of the C-1 condenser 
indicates a different dynamic response for the benzene flowrate 
at the bottoms of C-2. The C-1 condenser has a periodic behav- 
ior whereas the deviation in C-2 defines a sustained increase. In 
consequence, both scenarios differ notably regarding the severity 
magnitude. The difference of the severity levels of both scenar- 
ios can be illustrated in Fig. 11 with the variations of the reagents 
flowrates. The middle column of this chart shows that the benzene 
and propene flowrates have a drastic decrease after the occurrence 
of the deviation in C-2. Obviously, the distillate of C-2 has an im- 
portant reduction in its flowrate that cannot be compensated by 
the flow control of the reactor feed. This result explains the reduc- 
tion of the thermal loads that is discussed above ( Fig. 10 ). 
Moreover, the flowrate variations through the process can re- 
sult in certain hazardous events associated with the liquid contain- 
ment in other vessels of the separation unit. For instance, Fig. 12 A–
C show that the reduction of the coolant flowrate of a condenser 
causes an immediate decrease of the liquid level in the corre- 
sponding reflux drum. This fact results in the damage of the reflux 
pump due to an insufficient liquid feed rate. In the same manner, 
the sumps of C-1 and C-2 have a slight level increase ( Fig. 12 D and 
E) whereas the sump of C-3 is completely filled ( Fig. 12 F). This fact
induces an overfilling at the bottom of the column that reaches the
inlet nozzle of vapor coming from the reboiler. These issues con- 
firm the necessity of setting up high-level and low-level alarms in 
the reflux drums and the bottoms of the distillation columns. 
This result illustrates the necessity of implementing a set of 
protection layers in the distillation columns. The departure from 
normal conditions of the liquid levels, temperature or pressure 
activates the corresponding alarm in order to alert the operator. 
However, greater deviation levels require the action of override 
systems to maintain the process operation. In this case, safety bar- 
riers such as the activation of redundant equipment or utilities to 
increase reliability can be added. Additionally, the interlock shut- 
down systems can be included in order to avoid events that af- 
fect the integrity of the system. These protection layers are not the 
subject of this paper. However, their sizing will be part of a com- 
plementary study. 
5.2. Vent releases in the distillation columns 
The severity of the three simulated scenarios can also be dis- 
criminated by the overpressure levels reached in the distillation 
columns. The dynamic responses of these process variables can be 
described as follows: 
• Scenario 5: The deviation immediately causes an overpressure
in the three distillation columns. The overpressures of the sim- 
ulated scenario are characterized by a periodic behavior in each
one of the separation equipment. Fig. 13 A shows that the ma- 
jor increase (2.5 bar) is established in the column with the
deviation whose top stage overcomes the set pressure of the
process safety valve (14.4 bar). In accordance with this result,
Fig. 14 A indicates a high vent release in this tower after the oc- 
currence of the deviation that is followed by periodic smaller
Fig. 11. Influence of the coolant flowrate reductions on the molar flowrates.
vent releases. On the contrary, the other columns have pres- 
sure increases below 0.5 bar. During the simulation, the maxi- 
mum overpressures of C-1 and C-2 are below the set pressures 
of their relief devices. Therefore, the simulation does not pre- 
dict any vent release for these columns in this scenario. 
• Scenario 6: Fig. 13 B shows that the reduction of the heat re- 
moval in the condenser of C-2 has a similar effect as the devia- 
tion in C-1 during the first 2.3 h of abnormal operation. There- 
after, the vent flowrate becomes steady as well as the overpres- 
sure level at the top of the column ( Fig. 14 B). This result is ob- 
served because the column is designed to remove the unreacted
benzene. The analysis of the vent flowrate defines this deviation
as the most severe scenario due to the continuous hydrocarbon
leakage at the top of C-2. This fact underlines that a process
safety valve is not enough to prevent a hazardous overpressure 
caused by a failure in the condenser. Therefore, it is necessary 
to implement a complementary safety barrier to avoid the sus- 
tained feed to the column C-2. Generally, an emergency inter- 
lock shutdown is added to cut the feed to the chemical reactor 
( Kister, 1990 ). 
• Scenario 7: Fig. 13 C shows that the deviation occurred in the
column C-3 causes an overpressure with a lower severity with
regard to the two previous scenarios. In fact, the maximum
pressure at the top of C-3 just reaches the set pressure (2.0 bar).
Thus, the valve position of the process safety valve only shows
a low opening during a short time lapse. Moreover, this sce- 
nario only predicts an overpressure in C-3. Since the column
Fig. 12. Influence of the coolant flowrates reductions on the liquid levels in the reflux drums and sumps.
Fig. 13. Pressure increase in the distillation columns after the coolant flowrate reduction in one of the condensers FLO: full-lift opening pressure SP: set pressure RP:
reseating pressure.
C-3 is out of the recycle loop, the deviation effects do not have
interactive consequences on the other columns.
6. Loss of heating in an upstream column (scenarios 8 & 9)
In this part, the loss of heating in an upstream column is stud- 
ied. This deviation has been previously discussed in the research 
work of Kister (1990) . This author shows that the reduction of 
the heating efficiency in a distillation tower can induce an over- 
pressure in downstream equipment. This fact is due to the signifi- 
cant decrease of the vapor flowrate in the upstream column, which 
reduces its liquid holdup and generates its weeping or dumping. 
Thereafter, the pressure drop of this column is considerably af- 
fected along with the separation efficiency of the equipment. In 
consequence, the feed rate of downstream equipment, as well as 
the fraction of light compounds entering to it, are submitted to a 
drastic increase. The occurrence of this event may increase exces- 
sively the pressure of the downstream distillation columns because 
of the presence of light hydrocarbons in the low-pressure separa- 
tion equipment. The propagation effects associated with this devi- 
ation are considered in this section through two scenarios: 
Fig. 14. Vent flowrates generated by the coolant flowrate reduction in one of the condensers A. Column C-1 (Scenario 5) B. Column C-2 (Scenario 6).
• Scenario 8: Steam temperature decreased by 15 °C in C-1
• Scenario 9: Steam temperature decreased by 15 °C in C-2
6.1. Effects on the performance of the distillation columns 
The analysis of the propagation effects of the simulated sce- 
narios is initially based on the comparison of the flowrate profiles 
with those of the steady-state operation. For this purpose, the sim- 
ulation results shown in Fig. 15 are considered to describe the dif- 
ferent dynamic responses of the chemical process: 
• Scenario 8: The variation of the steam temperature constitutes
a permanent reduction of 12% in the heat transfer of the re- 
boiler of C-1. The effects of this deviation are shown in the left
column of Fig. 15 . This deviation induces a temperature diminu- 
tion in the column. As a result, the aliphatic compounds con- 
centrate at the bottom of the column instead of the distillate.
For this reason, an important increase of the propene flowrate
in the bottoms stream (0 to 12 kmol hr −1 ) can be observed in
Fig. 15 A. In addition, the results underline that the propagation
of this deviation also increases the flowrate of this hydrocar- 
bon from 6 to 13 kmol hr −1 at the outlet of the packed bed
reactor. Therefore, it is possible to identify a magnified effect
in the propagation through C-1 since a poor propene separa- 
tion is accompanied by a higher propene feed rate. This abnor- 
mal operation can be considered as a severe condition since the
bottoms propene flowrate should be approximately zero. The
variations of the propene flowrates have a direct impact on the
benzene flowrates ( Fig. 15 B and G). Evidently, the aliphatic hy- 
drocarbons fed to C-2 are recovered at the top of the column.
This fact implies a lower benzene recovery in the distillate of
this tower along with the increase of its concentration in the
bottoms stream. In consequence, a high amount of benzene is
temporarily fed to the column C-3 and the benzene makeup
flowrate diminishes permanently. Finally, Fig. 15 J and M show
that the flowrates variations of the alkylated hydrocarbons are
not significant. The rise of the benzene feed to C-3 increases
temporarily the amount of cumene in the bottoms of C-3. How- 
ever, this propagation effect is not permanent due to the action
of the controllers. Therefore, the production of cumene and di- 
isopropylbenzene does not present significant changes.
• Scenario 9: The variation of the steam temperature constitutes
a temporary reduction of 5.5% in the heat transfer of the re- 
boiler of C-2. The effects of this deviation are shown in the
right column of Fig. 15 . This scenario differs notably from the
scenario 8 because the deviation propagation only has an im- 
portant effect on one of the columns. This result can be ob- 
served by comparing Fig. 15 G with I. The reduction of the steam
temperature in C-1 causes a temporary increase of the benzene
flowrate at the bottoms of C-2. However, the reduction of the
steam in C-2 column makes it permanent. These simulation re- 
sults allow establishing that the system is capable to regulate 
the benzene flowrate in B2 when the failure is in C-1 but not 
when it is in C-2. Additionally, scenario 9 does not constitute 
a significant variation of the propene flowrates. This result il- 
lustrates that the location of the process deviation induces dif- 
ferent issues in the chemical process operation. Evidently, the 
presence of a recycle stream constitutes a mitigation factor for 
the benzene flowrate regulation and a propagation factor for 
the propene flowrate. 
Furthermore, the response of the column flooding factors in 
scenarios 8 and 9 is similar to that observed in the makeup 
flowrate variations scenarios. These effects are shown in Fig. 16 . 
The simulation results show that the dynamic responses of the 
flooding factors of the distillation columns are determined by their 
position with regard to the origin of the process deviation. For this 
reason, the analysis of these key process variables is divided into 
the following categories: 
• Columns with the deviation: Fig. 16 A and E show that the loss
of heating in a reboiler reduce the flooding factors of the stages
of a distillation column that are located below the feed inlet
in a distillation column whereas the upper stages have an in- 
crease. These effects correspond directly to the accumulation of
the light hydrocarbons at the bottom of the column caused by
the lower boiling rates in these columns.
• Downstream columns: Fig. 16 B and F show that the behavior
of the flooding variables in this equipment is mainly associated
with the benzene feed rates. The temporary variation that is
observed with the deviation in C-1 and the permanent varia- 
tion that is observed in the deviation occurred in C-2 decrease
the flooding factors of the downstream columns. These changes
correspond to the reduction of the gas velocity through each
distillation column. A priori, an increase of these factors would
be expected due to the inlet of the light hydrocarbons. How- 
ever, this is not the case because the densities of the rising
vapors decrease because of the chemical compositions. In ad- 
dition, the hydrocarbons that should be recovered in the dis- 
tillates (benzene for C-2 and cumene for C-3) are now concen- 
trated at lower stages. This fact represents an increase of the
down-coming liquid flow as well. The characteristics that are
discussed above are also observed in the last column ( Fig. 16 C).
Therefore, it is possible to establish that the decrease of the
flooding factors is observed with a lower intensity for the last
equipment.
• Upstream column: In spite of the presence of a recycle stream
in the chemical process, the flooding factors of the column C-1
are not significantly affected when the heating of the column
C-2 is decreased ( Fig. 16 D).
The simulation results show that the column flooding should 
not be considered as a severe negative consequence of the two 
Fig. 15. Influence of the loss of heating in a distillation column on the molar flowrates.
considered scenarios. For this reason, this type of effects is mainly 
associated with the vent releases that are caused by the overpres- 
sures at the top of the separation equipment. 
6.2. Vent releases in the distillation columns 
The deviation propagations on the reagent flowrates induce 
different overpressure levels in the distillation columns. Initially, 
Fig. 17 shows that the deviation occurring in C-1 results in a per- 
manent overpressure at the top of C-2 and a transient increase 
at the top of C-3. The overpressure emerged from the heating re- 
duction in C-1 is associated with the permanent propene increase 
at the bottoms of C-1 and the transient benzene increase at the 
bottoms of C-2. Similarly, the heating reduction in C-2 induces 
an overpressure in C-3 by the presence of benzene in its feed 
stream. However, both scenarios differ from each other since only 
the deviation in C-1 causes an overpressure that reaches the set 
pressure of a process safety valve ( Fig. 17 A). In consequence, the 
only hazardous event is triggered by the decrease of the heating 
steam temperature in C-1 ( Fig. 18 ). The process safety valve PSV- 
2 is opened, which induces a vent release of hydrocarbons. This 
flowrate is continuously increasing due to the influence of the re- 
cycle stream. Indeed, the propene loss through the vent generates 
a decrease of the benzene makeup stream by the action of the feed 
control of the chemical reactor (BENZENE_FC). In consequence, an 
Fig. 16. Variations of the flooding factors of the distillation columns caused by the loss of heating in an upstream column.
Fig. 17. Pressure increase of the distillation columns after the loss of heating in a distillation column FLO: full lift opening pressure SP: set pressure RP: reseating pressure.
Fig. 18. Vent flowrate established in the column C-2 for the scenario 8.
additional amount of non-reacted propene will be vented through 
PSV-2 as well. This phenomenon will induce a snowball effect dur- 
ing the deviation propagation. This propene increase is low during 
the initial stage of the deviation (0.69 h after the occurrence of 
the deviation). Then, this escalating abnormal operation leads to a 
surge of propene from C-1 to C-2 that is observed through a 6% 
reduction of the distillate flowrate in C-1. Moreover, the increase 
of the vent flowrate is also due to the hysteresis characteristics of 
PSV-2 ( Fig. 3 ), which contributes to the discontinuity observed in 
Fig. 18 . 
This result establishes that this scenario must be prioritized 
over the deviation in C-2 due to its higher potential negative con- 
sequences. However, the loss of heating in C-2 also describes a 
pressure increase in the column C-3 ( Fig. 17 B). Thus, it is also nec- 
essary to consider this scenario in the risk assessment because a 
greater reduction of the steam temperature in C-2 may result in 
another vent release in the column C-3. 
6.3. Effects of the deviation on the performance of the packed bed 
reactor 
Fig. 19 shows that scenario 8 develops a new steady-state oper- 
ation that is defined by a reduction of 5% in the conversion rate of 
propene and a decrease in the cumene/by-product ratio. Previously, 
it is discussed how this disturbance results in a higher feed rate of 
propene to the separation unit. In accordance with this statement, 
it is possible to analyze the propagation process by considering the 
factors that affect negatively the conversion in the packed bed re- 
Fig. 19. Influence of the loss of heating in a distillation column on the conversion of propene and the selectivity of the reaction.
actor. The simulation results show that the presence of aliphatic 
hydrocarbons in the distillate of C-2 reduces the top temperature 
of this column from 120.8 °C to 106.3 °C. This fact diminishes the 
feed temperature of the reactor from 170 °C to 161.3 °C and there- 
fore the kinetics of the chemical reaction is negatively affected. In 
this manner, it is possible to explain the synergic effect that is dis- 
cussed above by considering the effects on the yield of the alkyla- 
tion reactions. 
Upstream the reactor the permanent temperature decrease of 
the streams indicates that the temperature and flow controls do 
not have a sufficient response to this type of deviations. The reac- 
tor feed remains at a low temperature even if the heating steam 
of the exchanger E-2 reaches the maximum manipulated pressure. 
This result is due to the propene flowrate increase and the new 
vapor-liquid equilibria of the column C-2. This abnormal operation 
can only be stabilized by a continuous vent and an excessive recy- 
cle of light hydrocarbons ( Fig. 18 ). 
7. Discussion of the process deviation results
The three types of simulation scenarios that are considered in 
this study differ notably in the severity and location of the nega- 
tive effects associated with the propagation of the process devia- 
tions. For this reason, a risk assessment is carried out in order to 
rank the abnormal operation scenarios. Risk analysis is a decision- 
making tool that allows performing a tolerability judgment. This 
can be achieved by analyzing the evolution of an operating vari- 
able. For this study, the risks associated with flooding and over- 
pressure phenomena are discussed. Scenarios 2 and 3 do not gen- 
erate these risks. Thus, they are not considered in this section. 
7.1. Pressure drop ratio 
The pressure drop per meter in each distillation column ( 1P r ) 
is determined as the ratio between the pressure drop in the col- 
umn ( 1P ) and its height ( H ). This operating parameter determines 
a comparative basis of the flooding or weeping levels. For this rea- 
son, it is taken into account for the risk assessment of this study. 
The dynamic analysis considers the scheme shown in Fig. 20 to 
establish the maximum variation of the pressure drop ratio after 
the occurrence of the deviation ( 1P r ). Likewise, the analysis also 
determines the time that is required by the column to reach the 
maximum variation ( 1t ). 
The responses of the three distillation columns to each process 
deviation are shown in Table 7 and Fig. 21 . For instance, the ma- 
jor variations of the pressure drop ratio in the column C-1 are 
observed for the increase of the aliphatic flowrate and the reduc- 
tion of the steam temperature in its reboiler. These behaviors agree 
with the surge of the flooding approaches in Fig. 8 A as well as 
Fig. 20. Determination of the maximum deviation and its corresponding time lapse
( 1t).
their rapid decrease in Fig. 16 A. Similarly, this analysis can be ex- 
tended for the analysis of consequences in the columns C-2 and 
C-3.
The risk assessment presented in this section evaluates the
flooding or weeping risks emerged from all the deviations. For this 
purpose, a severity index is proposed with the following levels: 
1. Low severity index (value equal to 1): Maximum variation of the
pressure drop ratio lesser than 10% of the steady-state value.
2. Medium severity index (value equal to 2): Maximum variation of
the pressure drop ratio between 10% and 20% of the steady- 
state value.
3. High severity index (value equal to 3): Maximum variation of the
pressure drop ratio greater than 20% of the steady-state value.
Likewise, the dynamic response ( Fig. 21 ) indicates the time pe- 
riod during which the propagations reach its maximum or mini- 
mum values. It also establishes the time period during which the 
operators can react effectively to the occurrence of a specific de- 
viation ( Berdouzi, 2017 ). For example, the increase of the aliphatic 
makeup flowrate reaches a pressure drop ratio of 5.3 mbar m −1 in 
the column C-1 after 39 min (0.65 h) of abnormal operation. The 
flooding phenomenon dynamics is taken into account with a sec- 
ond index whose levels are based on the time elapsed to reach the 
maximum variation: 
1. Slow dynamics index (value equal to 1): Pressure drop peak value
reached in more than 30 min (0.5 h) after the occurrence of the
deviation.
2. Moderate dynamics index (value equal to 2): Pressure drop peak
value reached between 10 min (0.17 h) and 30 min (0.5 h) after
the occurrence of the deviation.
Table 7
Pressure drop ratio in each distillation column.
Deviation C-1 C-2 C-3
1P r (mbar ·m −1 ) 1t (hours) 1P r (mbar ·m −1 ) 1t (hours) 1P r (mbar ·m −1 ) 1t (hours)
Scenario 1 5.32 0.65 3.85 1.54 2.11 15.65
Scenario 4 3.76 0.34 3.37 1.38 4.35 5.62
Scenario 5 2.97 0.43 3.10 0.08 3.80 1.12
Scenario 6 3.27 0.78 1.94 0.72 3.70 6.09
Scenario 7 4.30 – 3.59 – 2.17 0.14
Scenario 8 3.27 0.40 3.29 1.32 3.79 2.68
Scenario 9 4.37 0.98 3.22 0.38 3.61 0.35
Fig. 21. Variations of the pressure drop per meter generated by the process deviations.
Table 8
Flooding risk assessment risk levels: low or slow (normal) – medium or moderate (italic) – high or quick (bold).
Deviation C-1 C-2 C-3
Severity index Dynamics index Risk index Severity index Dynamics index Risk index Severity index Dynamics index Risk index
Scenario 1 3 1 3 1 1 1 3 1 3
Scenario 4 2 2 4 1 1 1 3 1 3
Scenario 5 3 2 6 2 3 6 2 1 2
Scenario 6 3 1 3 3 1 3 1 1 1
Scenario 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 9
Scenario 8 3 2 6 1 1 1 2 2 2
Scenario 9 1 1 1 2 2 4 1 2 2
3. Quick dynamics index (value equal to 3): Pressure drop peak
value reached in less than 10 min (0.17 h) after the occurrence
of the deviation.
Table 8 lists the risk indexes estimated for this case study ac- 
cording to the pressure drop ratios and the response times. The 
risk levels prioritize the simulation scenarios that have drastic 
changes in the mechanical performance of the distillation columns. 
The scenario ranking shown in Table 8 is based on a risk index, 
which corresponds to the multiplication of the severity and dy- 
namics indexes. This index allows classifying the risk according to 
the following criteria: 
1. Low-level risk: Risk index between 1 and 3.
2. Medium-level risk: Risk index between 4 and 6.
3. High-level risk: Risk index between 7 and 9.
The classification based on the maximum and minimum values
includes a majority of the scenarios into the medium and high- 
level risks. For example, the analysis of the column C-1 also allows 
considering the reductions of the coolant flowrates in the column 
C-1 and C-2 as high-level risk situations in spite of their short du- 
Table 9
Comparison of the vent releases generated by the most severe scenario of each process deviation risk levels: low (normal) – medium (italic) – high (bold).
Deviation C-1 C-2 C-3
Overpressure (bar) Max. vent flowrate Risk index Overpressure (bar) Max. vent flowrate Risk index Overpressure (bar) Max. vent flowrate Risk index
Scenario 1 – – 1 – – 1 – – 1
Scenario 4 – – 1 – – 1 0.34 – 2
Scenario 5 2.89 204.8 3 0.53 – 2 0.12 – 2
Scenario 6 – – 1 0.65 211.3 3 0.27 – 2
Scenario 7 – – 1 – – 1 1.02 1.0 3
Scenario 8 – – 1 0.60 42.0 3 0.57 – 2
Scenario 9 – – 1 – – 1 0.48 – 2
ration or minor effects on the operation of the column. In accor- 
dance with the total risk indexes, the major risk associated with 
the operating stability of the distillation equipment is observed for 
the coolant flowrate reduction in C-3 (scenario 7). This criterion 
provides a better scenario description since it takes into account 
the chemical process dynamics. 
7.2. Column overpressure and vent release 
The previous section shows that the consequences of the prop- 
agation of a process deviation are determined by its capacity to af- 
fect the internal vapor flowrates of the distillation columns. Thus, 
it is also possible to prioritize the scenarios according to a risk 
analysis based on the column overpressure. In this study, a clas- 
sification is proposed according to the data listed in Table 9 , which 
compares the scenarios that develop the highest overpressure in 
the three types of deviations. The risk index is defined in this case 
according to the following criteria: 
1. Low-level overpressure risk (value equal to 1): No overpressure
in the distillation column.
2. Medium-level overpressure risk (value equal to 2): Insufficient
overpressure to open the process safety valve.
3. High-level risk overpressure (value equal to 3): Overpressure
that activates the PSV opening.
The results indicate that the highest overpressure levels are due
to the cooling system malfunctions whereas the minor effects are 
mainly associated with the changes in the compositions of the 
reactor feed. This result establishes a greater risk level for the 
coolant flowrate reduction since it constitutes the major instan- 
taneous vent release. Therefore, it represents a greater potential 
to form an explosive atmosphere due to hydrocarbons accidental 
leakage. 
This comparative analysis can be extended to any simulated 
scenario in order to provide a detailed comparison of the propaga- 
tion factors and the negative effects of each process deviation. As a 
result, the subjectivity in the determination of the hazardous event 
severity and likelihood during a HAZOP analysis can be diminished 
( Isimite and Rubini, 2016 ). In this manner, the simulation results 
can provide the necessary predictive information that allows eval- 
uating the response of a control structure and the pressure relief 
devices. 
8. Conclusions
This work shows that the dynamic simulation is an interesting 
tool to study the propagation of process deviation, useful and es- 
sential for process risk assessment. The goal of this research work 
is to assess the magnitude and dynamics of the deviation effects. 
The feasibility of this methodology is demonstrated through the 
simulation of a complex case study. The simulation results are di- 
rectly linked to the sizing and control strategies. Therefore, the 
dynamic response to each deviation is obviously associated with 
these simulation settings. That is why it is important to establish 
an appropriate representation of the system. Thus, an experimental 
study in normal and degraded modes is also necessary to validate 
the system model. 
We have implemented the dynamic simulation methodology on 
benzene alkylation process, which is composed of a reactor and 
a set of three distillation columns connected by a recycle stream. 
Thereafter, we study the deviation propagation along this process. 
Based on lessons learnt from previous accidents, we focus on de- 
viations that can result in a pressure increase of the distillation 
columns. 
The simulation results put in evidence the deviation propa- 
gation effects through the alkylation reactor and the distillation 
columns. The simulation scenarios identify the abnormal condi- 
tions in which an overpressure is feasible as well as the flowrate 
profiles of the eventual vent releases. The deviations can result in a 
periodic or permanent overpressure if the mitigation system does 
not include a complementary safety system. This additional control 
must respond directly to the disturbance or stop completely the 
operation of the chemical process. Thus, it is compulsory to take 
into account the main characteristics of the feasible process devi- 
ations as well as the operating conditions of an industrial process 
during the determination of the required safety barriers. 
Moreover, the recycle stream can be a propagation factor in ac- 
cordance with the characteristics of the manufacturing process. For 
instance, the reduction of the steam temperature on the reboiler 
of the column C-2 does not have any significant effect on the up- 
stream equipment. On the contrary, the reduction of this variable 
in C-1 constitutes not only the overpressure of the downstream 
distillation columns but also a decrease of 5% on the propene con- 
version to cumene. 
Finally, the comparison of the simulation results is considered 
to propose a scenario classification based on the most severe ef- 
fects that are observed in the dynamic simulations of the chem- 
ical process. In accordance with this criterion, the case study de- 
fines the drastic decrease of the coolant flowrate in a condenser 
as the most critical event whereas the changes of the makeup 
streams represent the minor negative effects. Nonetheless, the lat- 
ter scenario must also be considered because it describes an exces- 
sive flooding in the columns. For this reason, the negative effects 
should always be determined for each process unit in the dynamic 
analyses in order to establish properly all the risks caused by the 
deviation propagation. 
Of course, this methodology should be applied to other devia- 
tions, in order to be able to prioritize scenarios that can result in 
an industrial accident. This work contributes to the definition of 
the worst-case scenarios and the required safety barriers. The sim- 
ulation tool can determine globally the potential effects of a pro- 
cess variation and provide predictive information to validate the 
nature and the sizing of safety barriers. The validation step consists 
in checking that the residual risk that remains after the action of 
safety barriers is acceptable. 
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